Namibia: Toward an Applied Political Economic Planning and Policy Perspective by Green, Reginald H.
NAMIBIA - Toward An Applied Political Economic Planning and Policy Perspective
By Reginald Herbold Green
We do not believe in a system that sells people.
- Katatura Strikers
It must be borne in mind that the Namibian people are shedding blood to 
liberate each and every inch of Namibian soil, thus each and every inch of the 
Namibian land must and will belong to the Namibian people.
- President Sam Nujoma
To plan is to choose, choose to go forward.
- President Julius Nyerere
Toward an Applied Political Economy of Transition
Political economic analysis is rarely, and political economic processes never, 
value free, unconstrained or outside a contextual frame. Applied political 
economy from a policy and planning perspective requires looking from a 
particular actor's (sub class, corporation, interest group, social formation) 
set of objectives, strengths and limitations and requires a set of assumptions 
about the economic parameters and context in which the applied political 
economy is to operate.
This paper seeks to outline elements toward and issues in a SWAPO directed 
political economy of transition in Namibia. The basic SWAPO positions used in 
articulating issues and elements are those contained in the 1976 SWAPO 
Programme of Action and in To Be Born A Nation. The period covered is 
basically from today through the first two years of independence. The basic 
assumptions are:
1. Namibia will become independent (18-60 months).
2. There will be a negotiated - not a purely military - transition.
3. The government of independent Namibia will be formed by SWAPO.
4. There will not be an active war on the Orange River border.
5. South Africa will continue to hold Walvis Bay after independence.
6. The territorial economy will be depressed but functioning.
7. There will be a rapid and significant exodus of Europeans especially 
among expatriates (as opposed to "Sud Westers"), Afrikaners and public
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sector personnel but not a near Immediate tidal wave (i.e. more, more 
rapidly than Zimbabwe but less, less rapidly than Mozambique).
8. The so-called ’external debt’ issued by the AG will be repudiated.
9. Relations with South Africa will be poor but with no immediate or 
total rupture in economic relations.
These assumptions are crucial to formulating a strategy/policy and applied 
research agenda. To the extent they are wrong, agenda revision will be
needed.
Action and Information: Priorities and Sequences
Political economic transition in Namibia will be characterised by a very large 
number of actions which it is necessary to take - at some time - and even more 
which it would be desirable to take - at some time. It will be equally 
characterised by shortages of most resources - not least of data, analyses and 
analytical capacity and senior decision taker time - but not equal shortages 
and, indeed, surpluses of some (e.g. unskilled labour power potentially, 
beef).
Identifying priorities and sequences will be critical as will be determining 
what scarce, relatively available and surplus resources an action will 
require. Top priority and urgency actions requiring scarce resources need to 
come first. Scarce resource intensive actions which are critical but less 
urgent will need to be deferred. Surplus resource using actions which raise 
relevant production and/or incomes should be slotted in as early as their 
scarce resource demand component can be met.
Planning and policy formulation include several interactions and tensions:
a. strategic (or mega) issues and their elucidation/resolution are a 
precondition for setting up, articulating and following through on 
macro and micro ones. e.g one cannot define micro policies to be 
pursued by Namibia relative to the EEC or sectoral ones in respect of 
personpower development without facing what production structures and 
relationships are sought strategically.
b. But without knowledge of what exists and what is attainable at micro 
and sectoral level the mega (strategic) level will remain ill defined, 
full of gaps and non operational.
c. To attempt to define and act on strategy or policy without knowing 
where one is and how one came to be there is like setting off for 
Windhoek without first determining whether one is east of Gobabis or 
south of Luderitz and whether one has petrol in the tank.
d. But to concentrate solely on the present and its objective constraints 
- or on the historic process and the failure of attempts to alter it 
by pure optimism of the intellect - can lead either to fatalism or to
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a view that only very marginal change is ever possible. One necessary 
short and medium run strategic goal is to loosen constraints to create 
room for manoeuvre.
The balance of this paper will review:main themes in SWAPO's political economy 
of liberation; certain objective constraints or parameters limiting
transitional political economic action and achievement; notes toward 
priorities; the political economics of contingency planning with special 
reference to destabilisation.
SWAPO: Toward a Political Economy of Liberation
The themes which SWAPO has emphasised fall in seven clusters:
1. ownership patterns (mode of production);
2. rural development;
3. distribution (exploitation and equality);
4. national economic integration/self reliance;
5. basic services;
6. participation;
7. external economic relations.
The mode of production goal is socialism: "Bringing all the major means of 
production and exchange into the ownership of the people"; "planning and 
development will be covered by the principles of scientific socialism". 
Transition is seen as phased: land, mineral and fishing rights, public
utilities, ex-South African state companies and some key enterprises are the 
implicit initial public sector. State, cooperative, joint venture and private 
ownership are envisaged for an extended period. A national planning framework 
and negotiated agreements (including joint ventures) are seen as the 
instruments to ensure consistency with the interests of the people and with 
Namibian economic development. For the crucial mining sector Botswana is 
cited as a relevant example.
"Comprehensive agrarian reforms aimed at giving the land to the tillers" are 
seen as a pre-condition for rural development. Colonial land ’rights' are to 
be extinguished and continued use of part of the land to be subject to 
negotiation. Peasant cooperatives, worker self management and state farms are 
cited as possible organisational forms. More knowledge, production inputs and 
agriculture linked industries (to process outputs and produce inputs) are seen 
as means to increasing output to achieve self sufficiency in food and 
acceptable levels of productivity and income.
"The abolition of all forms of exploitation..." is linked both to the 
transition to socialism and to equality. Urban/rural and regional equality 
are specifically cited. The abolition of the ’contract’ labour system, child 
labour and "humiliating servant systems" and the establishment of non 
discriminatory wage and salary scales and of strong independent trade unions 
are presented as - inter alia - means to equitable wages and to worker 
participation in management. The degree of equality sought and the pace of 
reduction of inequality are imprecise: "payment according to ones
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contribution, within a transition to socialism and linked to opposition to
urban/rural inequality indicates direction but neither speed nor point of
arrival.
National economic integration and self reliance are presented as integral to 
national development. Equality of access to work, reduction of urban/rural 
inequalities, abolition of ’contract1, provision of education and training are 
viewed as economic instruments as well as broader components of creating ’’One 
Namibia, One Nation”. This approach has not been perceived by SWAPO as
inconsistent with maintaining or increasing overall levels of exports (subject 
to greater local use of meat, milk, fish, fishmeal and some shift from animal 
husbandry to crops). It is seen as altering allocation of foreign exchange, 
public revenue and investible surpluses derived from exports to restructure
the domestic economy in a more integrated way.
Basic service provision is presented largely in terms of health and education 
with some attention to water. Urban services have only begun to be considered 
- surprisingly given the massive population shifts likely to follow from the 
ending of contract. The balance of emphasis within health and education is on 
a broad base (e.g. preventative and primary health care; universal literacy 
and primary education). Programmes in these two areas are more articulated 
than elsewhere because SWAPO has substantial operational experience. However, 
the attempt to avoid elitism and maintain high standards by having both high 
quality and broad access - e.g. rapid movement to universal form four 
education, effective primary teaching in both the home (how defined in urban 
areas?) and the national (English) language - and by having them rapidly may 
not be viable because of their (personnel and finance) implications.
Participation is presented as a means to and a goal of economic 
reconstruction. Trade unions and worker self management, the role of women, 
effective involvement of those affected in government decisions (implicitly by 
decentralisation - a term not used because of the danger of confusion with the 
occupation regime’s ’fragmentation’ system), cooperatives, community and 
voluntary (basically church) action are cited as modalities for participation. 
In respect to SWAPO a tension exists. "To unite all Namibian people... into a 
vanguard Party" on the one hand posits a broad, participatory and on the other 
an informed elite, leadership Party - a tension which experience in Angola, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe suggests is hard to resolve.
External economic relations are seen as subordinate to and consequential on 
basic goals, but as critical to achieving them. Reduction of linkages with 
South Africa (diversifying trade, personnel, knowledge and finance sources) 
and systematic construction of regional interdependent linkages are clear 
priorities.
Five points stand out:
1. Economic and political relations are seen in terms of struggle with 
the state as an instrument in that struggle over allocation of power, 
participation, real income not as a neutral mediator and coordinator;
2. Liberation is seen to require initial radical changes;
3. However, some overlap of interests among sub-classes/interest groups
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is seen; therefore negotiated phased change is seen as possible;
4 . The magnitude of the allocational and other implications of certain goals 
- e.g. "ending contract", achieving an end to urban/rural inequality; 
termininating South African links; solving interim personnel/institutional 
problems do not seem to be fully comprehended nor priorities and sequences 
more than sparsely articulated;
5 . Overall the Programme is objectively feasible assuming careful management 
of phasing, limitation of resource allocation to low priority areas, 
effective economic management and an absence of exogenous catastrophes.
Transition Under Constraint
The political economy of transition in Namibia will take place under severe 
constraints. They can be consciously loosened over time; to pretend they do 
not exist is a recipe for tightening them.
First, the fiscal position is a shambles thanks to depression, war, drought, 
'bantustan' creation and mismanagement. Creating workable tax, tax 
collection, budgetary, expenditure management, economic analysis and related 
institutions is an immediate priority to plan now and implement at 
independence.
Second, the administrative and public service system is obnoxious and will be 
obsolete and inefficient. Total restructuring is needed while avoiding a 
breakdown of health, education, agriculture and shifting resources from a high 
quality/narrow access to a substainable quality/broad access focus.
Third, directly productive sectors, already in poor shape, will be further 
weakened by white departures, plus uncertainty and de facto sabotage before 
and after independence. This is especially true of ranching and fishing. 
Avoiding collapse of the former is a top priority for rural income and food 
supply (and a priority for foreign exchange flow) reasons.
Fourth, transport will be in near chaos. The main port will have been ’lost', 
access to the basic railroad maintenance facilities is likely to be lost, much 
of the rail and road fleet will probably have 'expatriated itself'. 
Articulating and pre-negotiating interim measures for alternative port 
facilities, railway and lorry maintenance capacity and road/rail equpiment 
replacement are a top priority before independence; implementing them at 
independence.
Fifth, skilled, professional and managerial personnel losses will be severe. 
How severe is not calculable with any precision but of 35-40,000 white workers 
it would be optimistic to expect more than 15,000 to remain six months after 
independence. Planning and pre-programming of allocation of trained 
Namibians, identification and design of upgrading courses to allow Namibians 
to repalce middle level Europeans and location of specific external sources 
for specific groups of key personnel are high on the pre-independence priority 
list and their implementation is of extreme urgency at independence.
Sixth, institutional and data bases are inadequate. Identification of key
institutional, current data and research based data requirements pre 
Independence for pre (where possible) and post independence action is a 
priority.
A special problem is the pre-independence constitutional assembly period. An 
executive and legislative gap would appear to exist. Interim legislative and 
limited executive appointment/supervision powers for the constitutional 
assembly would appear a priority.
Seventh, the economy is very open - about 90? of physical goods production is 
exported and perhaps 75-80? of physical goods used imported. In this context 
management of external transactions is both critical and difficult, especially 
in the context of no Namibian based recording or control institutions nor 
world market or sourcing oriented import/export enterprises.
Eighth, South Africa and the mining companies have created a 30 to 40,000 
household (10-20? of all households) black middle class (R3,600-12,000). 
Generalising these pay scales would be fiscally and economically suicidal. 
Limiting them to present categories would pose severe fiscal barriers to 
government service expansion and make a mockery of the SWAPO commitment to 
equality. Cutting them would have high political costs. Limiting their 
spread effects without creating vehement discontent among liberation war 
combatants would also pose problems.
Priorities - A Schematic Note
One cluster of priorites centres on keeping going main mines, water supply, 
power production and distribution, certain other key enterprises (e.g. main 
commercial banks, meat packing plants and petroleum distributors) and 
agricultural support services. Unless that objective is largely attained and 
foreign earnings (and import capacity) sustained, government revenue (the 
foundation for public services), investible surplus (ability to expand and to 
restructure productive capacity) will be lost. In Windhoek power and water 
failure would literally mean that the lights went out and the cholera came in. 
Keeping going does not preclude change, e.g. equal to or better than Botswana 
tax, ownership, valuation, training and local purchases terms for a joint
venture Namibian Diamond Mines as successor to Consolidated. In some cases it
requires radical change, e.g rapid upgrading of Namibian personnel and 
recruitment of replacement expatriates. But the need to avoid breakdown 
should be a first priority.
A second cluster is reconstruction of revenue collection and budgeting; 
structure and organisation of public administration; targets, service patterns 
and fund allocations of education and health; operation of that portion 
(probably one third to two thirds) of the ranching sector abandoned at or soon 
after independence; the rump of the fishing industry operating or operable 
from Luderitz. Until the first two are done the government cannot function
effectively in pursuit of any policies. The next two are critical both to
providing tangible, early benefits from independence (especially in rural 
areas) and to development of personpower and productivity. (The 'easy’ ranch 
solution of white expert run state farms would probably be a productive and a 
political disaster.)
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A third priority cluster relates to establishing or developing new or 
replacement institutions and sectoral strategies. Key items include a port to 
replace Walvis Bay plus Namibian based railway and lorry maintenance capacity 
and replacement railway rolling stock/road transport fleet; a central bank; 
export-import monitoring and enterprise (public, joint venture or private) 
capacity; personpower and national language (English) development; crop and 
especially small farm oriented research plus marketing - pricing - support 
services; participatory channels for workers, women, peasants, citizens 
generally.
Until the first is done, South Africa can turn the Namibian economy off as 
fast, as much, as often as it pleases. Pointing out that its presence in 
Walvis Bay is illegal is not a solution. A central bank is essential to 
control over finance and external transactions and therefore to serious 
economic management. Reducing dependence on South Africa requires capacity to 
identify appropriate alternatives. Without rapid personpower and national 
language development Namibia will remain heavily dependent on foreign 
personnel (and limited in ability to communicate with them or itself).
To avoid near depopulation in the rural north (and urban overloading and 
underemployment) and to reduce urban/rural inequality by raising rural 
immediate action to raise both incomes and access to services backed by laying 
the knowledge base to allow medium term increases in productivity are 
critical. Participation has direct economic efficiency aspects; it is also 
critical to sustained mobilisation and to defending transition toward the 
political economic goals posited by SWAPO from the sub-classes and interest 
groups (domestic and external) who will (often rightly) see them as against 
their interests. This is not a complete list but some ommissions e.g. a 
university are deliberate. What is ultimately important but not immediately 
essential should be postponed until adequate attention and resources can be 
allocated.
Certain priority strategic and policy areas do not fit into any one cluster:
a. ownership - which assets to acquire, when, how, why, on what terms, 
with what new operating structures? e.g. post 1966 mines early? with 
what management to be put in place? Livestock and improvements on 
ranches at market value to limit "expatriation" and sabotage?
b. external economic links - building regional links (e.g. the Trans 
Kalahari to tie in to SADCC markets and sources and greatly increase 
Botswana's room for manoeuvre); ACP accession to secure a beef quota; 
timing of withdrawal from Rand Monetary Area and South African Customs 
Union Arrangements.
c. population movement patterns both as they relate to urban service and 
employment demand and to achieving rural reconstruction and 
productivity increases with policies to influence the patterns and to 
accommodate to them.
d. income and employment/self employment policy including wage, salary, 
fringe benefit, producer price (e.g. to peasants and ranchers) and 
user price policies and research backed by incentives to increase 
productivity in labour intensive sectors of the economy and to provide 
productive employment/self employment for ex-domestic employees and
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for women moving off sub-subsistence plots to other sectors and places as 
households are rebuilt on the ending of ’contract’ - and of war.
e. expatriate/settler policy to retain those whose managerial, professional 
and artisanal skills are critical (and less costly and more relevant than 
replacement expatriates) so long as they are needed, to avoid 
inegalitarian income structures (e.g. the white going rate for all middle 
and upper level jobs) and to avoid the appearance of perpetuating 
differential racial remuneration packages.
The Political Economy of Contingency Planning
Planning and policy must recognise that future contexts and results will 
diverge from projections, especially when an economy is small and open, its 
data base weak and gappy and significant structural change is attempted as in 
any SWAPO-led political economy of transition in Namibia. In addition standby 
plans and policies to deal with major contingencies which, if they happen, 
radically alter structural parameters and contextual realities. The most 
critical is a South African strategy of destabilisation to prevent any 
effective political economic stabilisation and development in Namibia or to 
enforce a neo-colonial transition. Strategy based on the assumption that 
South Africa will not destabilise Namibia as an end in itself and will limit 
policy demands to, e.g., a quiet Orange River frontier are reasonable but 
require a fallback set of policies.
South Africa has - whether as a pre-independence destabilisation plan of its 
own or consequential on shorter run objectives - created the infrastructure 
for intensive, systematic, rapid destabilisation of Namibia. It has created 
the purported external debt which would be crippling if accepted and might 
damage external financial relations if repudiated. Second, it has created a 
budgetary shambles giving the impression to the superficial observer that 
Namibia is a fiscal "basket case". Third, via the ’Representative 
Authorities’ it has created an administrative monstrosity. Fourth, it has 
created a 30-40,000 household black middle class with consumption 10-40 times 
the black average. In respect to its skilled and professional members this 
creates future income distribution, fiscal and/or bitterness at loss of (not 
absolutely very high) incomes 'won’ under colonialism problems. In its ’RA' 
political, ’homeguard' and Koevet type fractions it could provide leadership 
and striking forces for orchestrated insurgency with a stronger starting point 
than the MNR and - if the economy goes badly and real incomes are rapidly 
eroded - with a potential broader political appeal. Fifth, by reinforcing its 
practical position in respect to Walvis Bay it has ensured that it will have a 
choke point to 'control' Namibian policy or to destabilise a 1'outrance until 
alternative port facilities are operational. Seventh, the sea bastion of its 
new Orange River Line at Alexander’s Bay is within mor-tar or launch distance 
of Namibia’s premier economic asset - Oranjemund - while the Swakop River 
’boundary’ of the Walvis Bay enclave is in similar range of the logical 
alternative harbour - Swakopmund.
The strategic and policy responses should be to dismantle or neutralize that 
infrastructure. First, the 'debt' should be repudiated now (very little is 
in fact held outside RSA) marshalling the 1971 International Court opinion and 
both post-colonial and post-revolutionary precedent. Second, the budgetary 
reconstruction priority should be seen as underlined as, third, should that
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for administrative reform and restructuring. Fourth, the professional and 
skilled fractions of the black middle class must be socially and politically 
mobilised and their individual losses of present income levels limited. The 
other fractions pose a straight security (or conversion) challenge. Fifth, 
Swakopmund must be reactivated rapidly, Luderitz used as an interim fishing 
base and road links to Angolan and to Atlantic ports given priority to 
establish a fallback position. Sixth, the cost to RSA of attacking Oranjemund 
and Swakopmund needs to be maximized. In large part this is a diplomatic 
policy problem, but relevant political economic choices do exist - e.g a De 
Beers joint venture presence at Oranjemund, a Netherlands or Nordic port 
management at Swakopmund.
Such action could reduce the effectiveness - and raise the cost - of a South 
African destabilisation for its own sake strategy. It can be planned and 
publicised now for implementation at independence.
Prefatory Conclusion
The forgoing analysis is not a total catalogue of strategic and policy
priorities. Nor has it - nor any other exercise of its type - been subjected
to SWAPO examination to determine how consistent its articulation and 
sequences are with SWAPO's interpretation of its goals and sequential 
priorities. It constitutes notes on a systematic articulation and 
prioretisation of a SWAPO goal informed strategy and policy.
The presentation of constraints and the number and nature of priorities may 
seem to be - and are - daunting. They mean that waste of resources - 
including time for reflection, review and research - will be very expensive 
and could well lead to a transition which made very little immediate progress 
structurally at a very high cost in output and tightened rather than loosened 
the limits on subsequent change. That is neither a counsel of despair nor to 
do as little as possible. The status quo is so deeply corroded that rapid 
deterioration and collapse will be inevitable in the absence of radical change 
or a manageable set of restricted initial priorities.
Strategy and policy are matters of choice. It is critical to take first steps 
away from the political economy of disintegration, to take them in the right
direction and to choose steps which make subsequent steps easier not harder.
By no means all of the contextual factors are negative. Namibia has a higher 
output per capita than any other African country at independence. Numbers of 
secondary and university graduates per 1,000 people will be second only to 
Zimbabwe among Eastern and Southern African countries at independence. SWAPO 
has done more economic thinking and personpower development than any other 
liberation movement except ZANU(PF) and will have a more systematic 
pre-planning base. These are not negligible positive factors. Pessimism of 
the intellect (at least recognition of the extent and intractibility of 
constraints) is justified but so is optimism of the will that a positive start 
toward a political economy of transition can be made and sustained.
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